Buy Me a Pound of Flesh: China\u27s Sale of Death Row Organs on the Black Market and What Americans Can Learn from It by Woan, Sunny
Santa Clara Law Review
Volume 47 | Number 2 Article 5
1-1-2007
Buy Me a Pound of Flesh: China's Sale of Death
Row Organs on the Black Market and What
Americans Can Learn from It
Sunny Woan
Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.law.scu.edu/lawreview
Part of the Law Commons
This Comment is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at Santa Clara Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Santa Clara Law Review by an authorized administrator of Santa Clara Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact
sculawlibrarian@gmail.com.
Recommended Citation
Sunny Woan, Comment, Buy Me a Pound of Flesh: China's Sale of Death Row Organs on the Black Market and What Americans Can Learn
from It, 47 Santa Clara L. Rev. 413 (2007).
Available at: http://digitalcommons.law.scu.edu/lawreview/vol47/iss2/5
BUY ME A POUND OF FLESH: CHINA'S SALE OF
DEATH ROW ORGANS ON THE BLACK MARKET
AND WHAT AMERICANS CAN LEARN FROM IT
Sunny Woan*
I. INTRODUCTION
In the last decade, China took immense strides to promulgate new
government orders that would closely mirror Western ideologies on
law and society.' On March 28, 2006, China's Health Ministry issued
legislation that banned the sale of human organs.2 As of this
writing, there has not yet been an in-depth analysis or
commentary on the significance and likely results of this new
policy. While this comment offers a rationale for the sudden
change in law, the primary focus will be on China's former
market in human organs, which were principally harvested
from its death row inmates,3 and the continuing residual
effects of this practice. Numerous commentators cite the
* Articles Editor and Book Review Editor, Santa Clara Law Review, Volume 47;
J.D. Candidate, Santa Clara University School of Law; B.A., Creative Writing
and Rhetoric, Binghamton University.
1. See generally Haochen Sun, Reconstructing Reproduction Right
Protection in China, 53 J. COPYRIGHT SOc'Y U.S.A. 223 (2005-2006)
(expounding on the changes in Chinese copyright law to comply with
international standards); Fareed Zakaria, Does the Future Belong to China?,
NEWSWEEK, May 9, 2005, at 26; Environmental Protection Laws in China, Mar.
3, 2004, http://www.zhb.gov.cn/english/law.php3 (providing hyperlinks to
numerous Chinese environmental laws from the past two decades); The Latest
Amendments to the Chinese Patent Law-A Comparative Study of the Patent
Law with the TRIPS Agreement, EAST IP, Oct. 17, 2001,
http://www.eastip.com/news-publications/latestamendment (discussing China's
progress toward implementing a patent law system based on Western models).
2. See China Bans Sales of Human Transplant Organs, ASSOCIATED
PRESS, Mar. 28, 2006, at httpJ/www.msnbc.msn.com/id/12050522/. The
legislation took effect on July 1 of the same year. Id; see also The Chinese Ministry of
Health Home Page, http:l/www.moh.gov.cn/ (last visited Jan, 20, 2007)
[hereinafter Chinese MOH].
3. See infra Part II.A.1.
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situation in China as an example of why Western nations
such as the United States should continue to uphold the ban
on human organ sales.4 Trends change with time, however,
and despite the current global shift toward banning the
commodification 5  of organs, this comment considers the
benefits of permitting private contracts for the sale of such in
the United States. Lifting the ban on organ commodification
would effectively combat the dearth of available organs that
American patients in need of transplants presently face.
This comment will first provide background on the issue
of organ commodification by examining how China harvested
organs from executed prisoners prior to the implementation of
the recent ban. Harsh scrutiny of China's former approach
serves as a lesson as to why individual rights must be
protected and why the proposition of taking organs from
America's death row prisoners is injudicious. With that said,
China's administration of this free market approach should
not deter Americans from noting the benefits of organ
commodification.
This comment will then explore the law and policy of the
American organ donation system and examine why the
inefficiencies of the current structure have led many to opt for
clandestine alternatives abroad, particularly in China's black
market organ trade.6 Despite the formal ban on organ
4. See generally Curtis E. Harris & Stephen P. Alcorn, To Solve a Deadly
Shortage: Economic Incentives for Human Organ Donation, 16 ISSUES L. &
MED. 213, 231 (2001) (proposing a government regulated market for
posthumous organs where licensed brokers operate under the oversight of the
Food and Drug Administration, and noting that the "example of China's sale of
organs from executed prisoners and the fear that the practice may become more
common is enough to give anyone pause").
5. The term "commodification" is used in this comment to denote the "free
market" approach to organ procurement, or the treatment of human organs as
an item that may be purchased and sold, similar to other forms of property.
However, William Anderson, an adjunct scholar of the Mises Institute, notes:
[Use of the word "commodification,"... in economic parlance truly is
meaningless. The word is supposed to denote the seizure by
unscrupulous business people of what should be a "free" good; thus
having the good in their possession, the new owners then slap a price
on it, thus creating artificial scarcity .... "[Clommodification," . has
become a buzzword ....
William Anderson, Communitarianism and Commodification, LUDWIG VON
MISES INST., Feb. 27, 2003, http://www.mises.org/story/1174.
6. See generally Wesley Chang, Arrested Development: Patent Laws,
Embryonic Stem Cell Research, and the Organ Black Market, 10 Sw. J.L. &
TRADE AM. 407, 409 (2004) ("The promulgation of the National Organ
[Vol: 47414
BUY ME A POUND OF FLESH
commodification in the United States, this comment exposes
the fact that a market for organs is nonetheless alive and
thriving within American borders.
To supply the demand for replacement kidneys, human
tissue, and other organs, and simultaneously reduce
American citizens' participation in the international black
market, this comment proposes the dismantling of the
current prohibition on organ sales.7 Time and time again,
financial incentives have proven to be the only reliable means
of encouraging people to act.8 Accordingly, the most efficient
way to address the organ shortage in the United States is to
legalize the sale of human organs. This comment therefore
proposes the legalization of organ sales as well as the
establishment of a privatized institution to supervise the
trade.9
II. THE JUXTAPOSITION OF TWO SYSTEMS: CHINA EMBRACES
COMMERCIALISM AND AMERICA'S DISGRACE BEHIND THE
FAQADE OF ALTRUISM
The bottom line premise of China's organ allocation
system prior to 2006 constituted the sacrifice of the life of an
offender in order to save the life of one wealthier.' Although
Chinese law officially banned the sale of human body parts,
government officials profited so greatly from underground
organ sales that they had no incentive to enforce such
prohibitions." Thus, despite its express disdain for free
market principles, China's socialistic government ironically
profited greatly from organ commodification. 2 On the other
hand, the United States, traditionally a champion of laissez-
faire economics, denounces the commodification of human
Transplant Act ("NOTA"), which prohibits the sale of organs for profit, has
created an artificial demand, driving Americans overseas to purchase organs
from live donors.").
7. See infra Part V.
8. See infra Part IV.B.3.
9. See infra Part V.
10. See Christine Gorman, Body Parts for Sale, TIME, Mar. 9, 1998, at 76
(stating that after an execution in China, "[dioctors at military hospitals ...
transplant the organs into wealthy foreigners"); Craig G. Smith, On Death Row,
China's Source of Transplants, N.Y. TiMEs, Oct. 18, 2001, at Al (stating that a
Chinese prison official acknowledged China's practice of stripping organs from
executed prisoners to transplant into wealthy patients).
11. See infra Part II.A.1.
12. See infra Part II.A.1.
2007] 415
SANTA CLARA LAW REVIEW
body parts, and relies solely on the altruism of its citizens.13
The underlying hypocrisy in both approaches results in the
deaths of thousands. Chinese prisoners neither consent to
the government's procurement of their organs, nor are they
offered compensation in return for their sacrifice. Meanwhile,
thousands of American patients die while waiting for an
organ donor to emerge. In order to contextualize the organ
procurement issue, this section will provide a background of
the two contrasting systems.
A. China's Approach to Organ Procurement
1. Capitalist Ventures, Communist Style: The Law Pre-
2006
The Chinese government vehemently denies that the sale
of human body parts occurs within its borders. 4 It claims
that the accounts of hundreds of doctors, prison officials, 6
human rights activists, 7 and even patients who say they have
received such services 8 are lies. If China's claims are true,
then why, in March of 2006, did the Chinese government feel
the need to announce a new, formalized law expressly
banning organ sales? 9
Just days before that announcement, undercover
reporters disclosed news of a massive harvest of human tissue
obtained from prisoners in northern China.2 ° Many of the
prisoners were political dissidents while others were
individuals who practiced the Falun Gong religion.21  The
13. See infra Part II.B.1.
14. See Craig G. Smith, Doctor Says He Took Transplant Organs From
Executed Chinese Prisoners, N.Y. TIMES, June 29, 2001, at A10.
15. See infra text accompanying notes 29-34 for the content of interviews
with local Chinese doctors.
16. See generally Smith, supra note 10 (interviewing prison officials about
the government's involvement in the black market trade in death row organs).
17. See infra note 62 (referencing Harry Wu, a well-known political activist
who investigates China's human rights violations).
18. Interview with family friend of the author, in Houston, Tex. (Sept. 24,
2004).
19. See infra Part II.A.2.
20. Bill Gertz, China Harvesting Inmates' Organs, Journalist Says, WASH.
TIMES, Mar. 24, 2006, at A5, available at
http://www.washingtontimes.com/national/20060323-114842-5680r.htm.
21. See id. In April 2000, hundreds of police officers reportedly arrested
ninety-five members of the Falun Gong religion who were demonstrating
[Vol: 47
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prisoners were detained in an underground facility below a
hospital22 and discovered by a news reporter during an
investigation of an unrelated matter.23 The reporter decried
the incident as "murder, and murder sponsored by the
state."24
The Chinese government insists that even if organs were
taken from executed prisoners, the practice only proceeded
after the prisoners or their families consented.25 Despite such
assertions, investigative reports show otherwise.26 In the few
instances that consent was sought, China's coercive
administrative approach 27  inevitably raises suspicion
peacefully at Tiananmen Square and hauled them away in white vans. Chinese
Seize Falun Gong Protesters, WASH. POST, Apr. 25, 2000, at A18. The
Communist Party labels the Falun Gong an "evil cult" and bars its practices
within China. Id. Thousands of Falun Gong followers have been sent to labor
camps without a fair trial. Id.
22. Gertz, supra note 20.
23. See id. Approximately 6,000 people were imprisoned in the
underground detention center. Id. The unused remains of the killed prisoners
were burned in a boiler room located inside the hospital. Id. When confronted
about this matter, Chinese public officials refused to comment. Id.
24. Id.
25. If a prisoner expressly states his refusal to donate his organs, "the
likelihood of his declaration... reaching his family is highly doubtful." Allison
K. Owen, Comment, Death Row Inmates or Organ Donors: China's Source of
Body Organs for Medical Transplantation, 5 IND. INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 495,
502 (1995). Furthermore, officials have the right to edit the wills and last
statements of prisoners for "slanderous statements and grievances." Id. As
human rights activists note, "[Tihere is nothing to prevent them from omitting
any expression by the prisoner of his intention to keep his organs. Officials
have carte blanche with regard to manipulating any documents written by the
prisoners." Id. The families of such prisoners are often afflicted with poverty,
and the government uses financial incentives to lure them into acquiescing to
the commodification of their relatives' organs. See id. If the families refuse, the
government will often send them exorbitant bills to cover the prisoner's food,
the bullet used to kill the prisoner, and other related expenses. Id. Some
families, however, are not notified of their relatives' execution. In one instance,
several government officials visited the family of a death row inmate prior to his
execution in an attempt to solicit the family's consent for the government to use
their son's organs. See Smith, supra note 10 (citing the case of Zhao Wei, a
prisoner executed in the Hunan province, whose execution took place without
any prior notice to his family). The family refused. Id. As a consequence, the
prisoner was later executed without any notice to his family. Id.
26. Owen, supra note 25, at 502.
27. The night before a prisoner's execution, he or she is bound, shackled,
and tied down to a chair while a judge reads a death warrant and presents the
warrant to the prisoner for his or her signature. Id. at 501. If the prisoner
refuses to sign, the judge then forcibly presses the prisoner's finger onto an
inkpad and stamps the document with the prisoner's fingerprint. Id. As
punishment for his or her lack of cooperation, the prisoner is then left in the
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regarding the voluntary nature of the prisoners' consent. As
one Western commentator observed, "Based on the abusive
circumstances of detention in China, from the time a person
is first accused of a capital offense until the moment of his or
her execution, any notion of 'free and voluntary consent' is
absurd.""
In June of 2005, reports surfaced on an incident in a
province just outside Beijing where retinas and kidneys were
being taken from executed gang members without their
consent.29 Many patients defended the practice, however,
arguing that whether or not prisoners consented, "Saving
someone's life using executed prisoner's organs is worth it."
31
Others, however, such as Dr. Wang Guoqi, are less certain
that the benefits outweigh the costs. Dr. Wang, who worked
at the Tianjin Paramilitary Police General Brigade Hospital,
testified before the United States Congress that his hospital
often sold organs to wealthy patients overseas.' His
superiors would order him to remove the requested body
parts from executed prisoners.2 Though he conceded to these
orders initially, Dr. Guoqi firmly refused to comply when
asked to remove kidneys from a living prisoner.3 His refusal
ultimately forced him to leave China, and he now seeks
political asylum in the United States.34
Experts report that approximately ninety percent of all
organs transplanted in China come from executed prisoners,35
yielding tens of millions of dollars in profit to the Chinese
government. 6  Commentators who favored this practice
chair, bound and shackled, until his or her execution. See id. Under these
administrative procedures, there seems to be little incentive for the government
to acquire an organ donation consent form any other way, if at all. See id.
28. See id. at 500.
29. Mark Magnier & Alan Zarembo, Death Row is Organ Source, China
Admits; A large share of the executions benefit foreign patients., L.A. TIMES, Nov.
18, 2006, at Al.
30. See id.
31. Bill Nichols, Panel Told of Organ Harvests on Executed Chinese Inmates,




35. Magnier & Zarembo, supra note 29.
36. See Whitney Hinkle, Note, Giving Until It Hurts: Prisoners Are Not the
Answer to the National Organ Shortage, 35 IND. L. REV. 593, 598 n.28 (2002)
(citing Dan Burton, Editorial, Outraged at China's Sale of Organs,
INDIANAPOLIS STAR, June 29, 1998, at A5); Smith, supra note 10 (stating that a
418 [Vol: 47
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argued that the prisoners committed atrocious crimes, and
that their personal rights could be revoked as a result.37
However, in China, more than half of the "atrocious crimes"
for which a death sentence may be issued are non-violent.3
In a March 2004 report, Amnesty International stated that
China executed 15,000 people per year, and that sixty-nine
percent of the country's executable offenses were for non-
violent crimes, such as drug dealing or the public practice of
illegal religions.39 Most kidneys purchased by patients came
from prisoners executed for minor offenses. 40  Furthermore,
many of these "criminals" who became the unwitting organ
donors to wealthy Americans were likely innocent, 41 as all too
often, the accused were convicted after rushed trials based on
confessions extracted under torture.42
International human rights groups and activists began
covering China's black market organ sales extensively in the
early 1990s, 43 shedding light on China's practices to Western
Chinese prison official acknowledged China's practice of stripping organs from
executed prisoners for wealthy patients and claimed that the practice produced
"tens of millions of dollars a year").
37. See generally Amnesty International USA, People's Republic of China:
Executed "According to Law"?-The Death Penalty in China,
httpJ/www.amnestyusa.org/abolish/document.do?id=806E474AFD57DC5980256
E5C00688E40 (last visited Jan. 23, 2007). The "strike hard" programs
implemented by the government are intended to target crimes it considers to be
atrocious, including white collar crimes. Id. According to Hu Jintao, President
of the People's Republic of China and Chairman of the CCP, "Any crime which
the law regards as serious should certainly receive serious penalties, and any
crime which is punishable by the death penalty according to the law, should
certainly receive the death penalty. This will ensure the healthy progress of
strike hard." Id.
38. See Sheri R. Glaser, Formula to Stop the Illegal Organ Trade: Presumed
Consent Laws and Mandatory Reporting Requirements for Doctors, 12 HuM.
RTS. BRIEF 20, 20 (2005), available at
http'//www.wcl.american.edu/hrbrief/12/2glaser.pdrd=l; see also Owen, supra
note 25, at 499 ("As a result of legislative changes promulgated by the
government since 1982, there are two and a half times as many criminal
offenses punishable by the death penalty and almost three times as many
articles of law stipulating capital punishment as there were prior to the
introduction of the criminal law in 1979.").
39. See Glaser, supra note 38.
40. Erik Baard & Rebecca Cooney, China's Execution, Inc., VILLAGE VOICE,
May 8, 2001, http://www.villagevoice.com/news/0118,baard,24344,1.html.
41. Craig S. Smith, Quandary in U.S. Over Use of Organs of Chinese
Inmates, N.Y. TiMES, Nov. 11, 2001, at Al.
42. See id. (noting that human rights groups claim that many individuals
are convicted after hurried trials based on confessions extracted under torture).
43. See generally Lena H. Sun, China's Executed Convicts Donate Organs
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nations for the first time. Yet it was not until 1997 that the
FBI, in response to information obtained by the Justice
Department regarding China's death row organ trade, began
to investigate these allegations.' In 2001, a congressional
subcommittee in Washington, D.C. rigorously questioned
Chinese government representatives regarding China's
commerce in organs from death row inmates. 45 The Chinese
representatives unequivocally denied the existence of the
enterprise.46 An official from the Justice Ministry maintained
that the trafficking of death row organs was infrequent,47 and
that it was carried out with the "presumed consent"' of the
prisoners when it did happen. 49 Although the Chinese
government claimed this phenomenon "rarely occurred," ° it
refused to disclose any information on the number of organ
extractions from prisoners that actually did occur.51 The
Chinese embassy in Washington, D.C. maintained that "[tihe
so-called sale of criminals' organs in China is a deliberate
fabrication with ill intentions."52 In a 2001 news conference,
Zhang Qiyue, China's Foreign Ministry spokeswoman, stated
Unwittingly, WASH. POST, Mar. 27, 1994, at A22.
44. Les Blumenthal, FBI Hears Report That China Executes Prisoners to
Sell Their Organs, FRESNO BEE, Oct. 23, 1997, at A8.
45. Organs for Sale: China's Growing Trade and Ultimate Violation of
Prisoners' Rights: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Int'l Operations and Human
Rights, Comm. on Int'l Relations, 107th Cong. 24 (2001) [hereinafter Hearings].
46. Annie Huang, China's Black Market for Body Parts Reaches the U.S.,
COLUMBUS LEDGER-ENQUIRER (Ga.), Apr. 19, 1998, at C9; see also Nancy
Scheper-Hughes, Postmodern Cannibalism?: Organ Transplants in the
Globalocal Market, WHOLE EARTH REV., Summer 2000, at 16 ("China enacted a
rule in 1984 stipulating that 'the use of corpses or organs of executed criminals
must be kept strictly secret, and attention must be paid to avoid negative
repercussions.'").
47. Huang, supra note 46.
48. The phrase "presumed consent" is defined as "the legal assumption that
organs and tissue may be taken from a brain-dead patient unless he or she has
previously registered a refusal." David Rowan, A Pound of Flesh For Sale,
TIMES (U.K.), Feb. 21, 2004, at 5, available at
http://www.davidrowan.com/2004102/times-inside-kidney-trade.html.
49. Id.
50. See Huang, supra note 46.
51. Laura-Hill M. Patton, Note, A Call for Common Sense: Organ Donation
and the Executed Prisoner, 3 VA. J. SOC. POL'Y & L. 387, 425 (1996).
52. See PrimeTime: Blood Money: Black Market for Kidneys From Chinese
Prisoners (ABC News television broadcast Oct. 15, 1997) [hereinafter
PrimeTime] (noting that after the Chinese embassy learned that PrimeTime
would broadcast its findings on China's trade in death row organs, the embassy
sent a letter to ABC requesting that it reconsider televising the report).
420 [Vol: 47
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that testimony regarding the country's black market trade in
death row organs were "sensational lies" and "a vicious
slander" against China. 3
Pressure from Western nations may have caused China
to buckle, however, and government officials now admit the
existence of the black market organ trade.54 At a 2006
conference of surgeons in Guangzhou, China, Deputy Health
Minister Huang Jiefu acknowledged the flourishing sale of
organs to foreigners.5 He conceded that the source of these
organs was executed Chinese prisoners.56 While the Deputy
raised this information in the context of a call to stop the
illegal organ trade, his statement is one of the first
admissions by high-ranking officials that this practice
exists.57
2. Following in the Footsteps of the West
A new law announced on March 28, 2006 by China's
Health Ministry officially banned the sale of human organs
and strengthened regulation over organ transplants by
mandating the written consent of organ donors,58 58 effective
July 1, 2006."9 Prior to the implementation of this policy, the
Chinese government insisted that it never harvested organs
from its death row inmates,6 0 nor did it permit transplants to
occur without the written consent of donors.6' In light of
China's previous denials of the existence of the organ trade,
the new rules appear somewhat redundant, or perhaps
53. See Smith, supra note 14. Zhang further declared, 'With regard to the
trade in human organs, China strictly prohibits that.... The major source of
human organs comes from voluntary donations from Chinese citizens." Id.
However, she did not deny that the government removes organs from executed
prisoners. Id.




58. Lindsay Beck, China Says to Ban Sale of Human Organs, REUTERS,
Mar. 28, 2006, available at
http'//www.populistamerica.com/china-saystbansaleofhuman-organs
(reporting on the recent ban of organ sales in China and the government's
objective of requiring written consent of donors and restricting the number of
hospitals permitted to perform transplant operations, along with the
establishment of ethics committees).
59. Id.
60. See supra text accompanying notes 14-25.
61. See id.
2007]
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indicative of a government that has not been entirely
forthright with its past black market involvement.2
Furthermore, the legislation requires all hospitals licensed to
administer transplant operations to form ethics committees to
review the treatment of each transplant procedure
performed.63 Essentially, the Chinese government instituted
a law to prevent a problem that it previously insisted did not
exist.
In light of the 2008 Olympics scheduled to take place in
Beijing, the quick change in law could be due to the recent
increase in worldwide media attention to China's death row
organ market.64 If China were to acknowledge that it
prospers financially from the sale of death row organs, such
an admission would almost certainly generate increased
contention and protests from human rights organizations. 5
Congress has already condemned China's practices.66 In fact,
California Representative Tom Lantos directed a resolution to
the International Olympic Committee advising it to reject
Beijing's bid to host the 2008 Summer Olympics based on
China's record of human rights violations, notably citing the
commodification of death row organs.67 Thus, it comes as no
62. Huang Jiefu, the Chinese Vice Minister of Health, noted that the
overwhelming majority of organs used for transplants in China presently come
from executed prisoners. See Beck, supra note 58. However, China's Foreign
Ministry spokesperson, while acknowledging that death row organs may have
been used on rare occasions, stated that the practice never occurred without the
prisoners' consent. Id. "It is slander to say that China tries to take away the
organs of death penalty victims," he said. "In China, if you want.., to donate
or receive transplant organs, you must go through strict formalities." Id.
However, as Harry Wu notes, "[The Chinese] don't have a concept to donate
body parts to other people." Vanessa Hua, Patients Seeking Transplants Turn
to China, S.F. CHRON., Apr. 17, 2006, at Al. On account of their culture and
tradition, most Chinese want to die whole. Id.
63. See Beck, supra note 58.
64. See generally Ros Davidson, Death Row Black Market for Organs,
SUNDAY HERALD, Nov. 25, 2001; Mark Dunn, Aussies Buy Kidneys in -China
Death Row Organ Trade, HERALD SUN (Austl.), Dec. 19, 2005, at 9 (discussing
the recent spawn of demand for transplantable organs from China); Thomas
Fuller, Transplant Lifeline to Death Row: Organs of Executed Convicts in China
Sold to Malaysians, GUARDIAN (London), June 16, 2000, at 2; Nick Smith, When
Selling Your Soul Isn't Enough, 30 SOC. THEORY & PRAC. 599, 603 (2004),
[hereinafter Selling Your Soul] (reviewing STEPHEN WILKINSON, BODIES FOR
SALE: ETHICS AND EXPLOITATION IN THE HUMAN BODY TRADE (2003)).
65. See Hearings, supra note 45.
66. Nichols, supra note 31.
67. Donny J. Perales, Rethinking the Prohibition of Death Row Prisoners as
Organ Donors: A Possible Lifeline to Those on Organ Donor Waiting Lists, 34
[Vol: 47422
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surprise that the Chinese government would formally publish
legislation to show the world that it is taking proactive
measures toward reformation." Despite these steps, the
enforceability of this new law remains to be seen.
B. The United States'Approach to Organ Procurement
1. Reliance on Altruism and Bureaucracy
The United States embraces an altruistic approach
toward organ procurement law.69  In 1984, Congress
developed a nationwide organ network to improve the
efficiency of organ allocation through the National Organ
Transplant Act (NOTA).7 °  Along with the Uniform
Anatomical Gift Act of 1968 (UAGA), 7" which focuses on
procurement of cadaveric organs, NOTA frames the current
organ donation policy in the United States.72 Under NOTA,
the Organ Procurement and Transplantation Network
(OPTN)73 was developed, which created the United Network
ST. MARY'S L.J. 687, 701 (2003).
68. See Chinese MOH, supra note 2.
69. See generally Michele Goodwin, Altruism's Limits: Law, Capacity, and
Organ Commodification, 56 RUTGERS L. REV. 305, 307 (2004) ("Organ
transactions today are a blend of altruism and commerce; of science, magic, and
sorcery; of voluntarism and coercion; of gift, barter, and theft." (internal
citations omitted)); Jennifer L. Mesich-Brant & Lawrence J. Grossback,
Assisting Altruism: Evaluating Legally Binding Consent in Organ Donation
Policy, 30 J. HEALTH POL. POLY & L. 687, 692-93 (2005) (addressing the
emphasis on voluntarism in organ donation policies in the United States);
Vanessa S. Perlman, The Place of Altruism in a Raging Sea of Market
Commerce, 33 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 163 (2005) (discussing the United States'
reliance on the altruism of its citizen donors in order to supply organs to
donees).
70. 42 U.S.C. § 274(e) (2000); National Organ Transplant Act, Pub. L. No.
98-507, § 301, 98 Stat. 2339 (1984); Adam J. Kolber, A Matter of Priority:
Transplanting Organs Preferentially to Registered Donors, 55 RUTGERS L. REV.
671,680 (2003).
71. The Uniform Anatomical Gift Act grants individuals the right to decide
whether they wish to donate their organs upon death. Kolber, supra note 70, at
679. All fifty states have adopted, in some form, the UAGA passed by the
National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws in the late
1960s. Id. Because this comment focuses on live donors, the UAGA is not
discussed further.
72. See Kolber, supra note 70, at 678-81 (discussing the roles of the UAGA
and NOTA in the current allocation scheme).
73. See id.; see also Organ Procurement and Transplantation Network,
About OPTN: Profile, http-//www.optn.org/optn/profile.asp (last visited Jan. 20,
2007).
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for Organ Sharing (UNOS). 74 OPTN and UNOS are primarily
composed of transplant centers and a handful of organ
procurement organizations, laboratories, and other health
and professional organizations. 5 Together, OPTN and UNOS
serve to effectuate the goals of NOTA by maintaining a
national list of donors and donees and a standardized system
for matching donors to donees based on established medical
criteria.76  Regional Organ Procurement Organizations
(OPOs) enforce UNOS directives throughout the respective
geographic territories of the United States.77
NOTA implemented UNOS in order to reduce
bureaucratic hurdles and to leave ample discretion to the
individual medical professionals who participate in the
OPOs. 78 Although the drafters of NOTA sought to encourage
organ donation, the Act expressly outlaws the sale of human
organs and prohibits direct compensation to organ donors or
their families.79  Although "valuable consideration" 0 is
strictly impermissible in exchange for human organs, a 1999
amendment to NOTA allowed for the reimbursement of travel
and related expenses to donors.8 ' Thus, despite this
amendment, human organs donated for transplantation in
the United States are essentially treated as a public trust.8 2
Critics of the current system argue that NOTA's legal
structure for organ procurement has hindered, rather than
helped, the success of organ recruitment.8 3 Forbidding the
74. See Kolber, supra note 70, at 680; see also United Network for Organ
Sharing, Who We Are, httpJ//www.unos.org/whoWeAre/ [hereinafter Who We
Are] (last visited Jan. 20, 2007).
75. See Organ Procurement and Transplantation Network, Members,
http://www.optn.org/members/ (last visited Jan. 20, 2007); United Network for
Organ Sharing, Members, http://www.unos.org/whoWeAre/membership.asp
(last visited Jan. 20, 2007).
76. See Who We Are, supra note 74.
77. Kolber, supra note 70, at 680.
78. See id.
79. See 42 U.S.C. § 274(a) (2000) (codifying the national ban on the
commodification of human organs); see also Kolber, supra note 70, at 680.
80. 42 U.S.C. § 274(a).
81. H.R. 2418, 106th Cong. § 1 (1999). Such "related" expenses include
'payment of such incidental non-medical expenses that are so incurred as the
Secretary determines by regulation to be appropriate." Harris & Alcorn, supra
note 4, at 223 (quoting H.R. 2418).
82. Organ Procurement and Transplantation Network; Final Rule, 63 Fed.
Reg. 16,296 (Apr. 2, 1998).
83. Harris & Alcorn, supra note 4, at 223.
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transfer of valuable consideration to organ donors shuts the
door on any kind of incentive other than altruism for
persuading healthy citizens to donate.84 Moreover, both
UAGA and NOTA impair the cost-effectiveness of transplants
for medical institutions.85 This, in turn, has caused many
institutions to cut back on resources allocated for organ
transplantations .86
2. An Underground Market in Body Parts, Domestic and
International
Despite the adamant insistence on a purely altruistic
model for organ procurement and allocation, an economic
market for organs nonetheless exists in the United States. In
fact, financial exchanges take place throughout the current
organ transplantation process.8 1 "The organ recipient 'pay[s]
to receive [the] organ,' procurement specialists are paid to
recruit donors, organ procurement organizations are
compensated for providing their services, and doctors are paid
to transplant the organ."88 It seems the only service not
receiving financial compensation is the giving of the organs
by the donor-which by all accounts is the most crucial step
in the entire process.8 9
Furthermore, a domestic black market in human body
parts runs along the underbelly of American society.90 For
example, in 1997, the Doheny Eye & Tissue Transplant
Banks struck million dollar deals with the Los Angeles
County's Coroner's Office for thousands of corneas that were
harvested without the donors' consent.91  In addition,
Professor Michele Goodwin, who spoke about organ
procurement and commodification issues at the 2002
84. See id. (commenting that "[tihe statutes . . . clos[e] the door to
innovative approaches such as estate tax relief, payment of expenses associated
with donation such as lost wages, travel expenses, coverage of other existing
medical bills, and funeral expenses").
85. Id.
86. Id. at 223-24.
87. Julia D. Mahoney, The Market for Human Tissue, 86 VA. L. REV. 163,
165 (2000).
88. Goodwin, supra note 69, at 327.
89. Id.
90. See id.
91. Ralph Frammolino, Harvest of Corneas at Morgue Questioned, L.A.
TIMES, Nov. 12, 1997, at Al.
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Medicine & Ethics Teachers Conference, noted:
[O]ther financial exchanges occur regularly in the human
biological transplantation community, involving the
transfer of organs . . . for often-significant sums ...
[T]hese exchanges occur in view of the law, without clear
regulation, language, or standards. For organ transfers,
consumers turn to the internet, newspapers and
sometimes clandestine organizations (and foreign
governments) to purchase these human supplies, while
biopharmaceutical companies are involved with a broad
array of business partnerships, the scope of which
includes collaborations with university hospitals, coroners'
offices, abortion clinics and morgues.92
However, Americans increasingly turn to the
international marketplace due to legal obstacles preventing
access to organ markets on the domestic front.93 Jim Cohan, 94
an organ broker in California, arranges transplants for U.S.
citizens abroad, in countries including China. He works out
of his Los Angeles office, J. Cohan & Associates,96 receiving a
commission for referring American patients overseas. These
overseas hospitals provide organs that Cohan believes are
taken with the "presumed consent" of the donor.97
A 1997 ABC News broadcast documented the purchase of
China's black market organs by American citizens. 98 To buy
an organ from China, patients contact a "go-between," an
organ broker with ties to the Chinese military.99 The go-
between is paid a commission by both the patient and the
military hospital for setting up the transaction. 00
Advertisements are often posted in Chinese-language
92. Goodwin, supra note 69, at 327-28 (citations omitted).
93. Michael Finkel, Complications, N.Y. TIMES, May 27, 2001, at 26.
94. Cohan has operated his organ brokerage business for over a dozen years
and has helped more than 300 Americans buy replacement organs overseas. Id.
However, he prefers not to refer to himself as an "organ broker" and uses the
term "international transplant coordinator." Id. When asked why he entered
the business, Cohan says, "There are plenty of spare organs to be had in other
parts of the world .... There's no need for a single person to die waiting for a
kidney." Id.
95. Rowan, supra note 48.
96. See J. Cohan & Assocs. Home Page,
http://www.transplantcoordinator.com (last visited Jan. 20, 2007).
97. See supra note 48 and accompanying text (defining "presumed consent").
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newspapers in the United States for those looking to hire a
go-between. 101
After establishing a relationship with a go-between,
buyers wait for the next scheduled round of executions;
generally, no longer than a few months. 10 2 The go-between
furnishes a list of the buyers' needs to the military hospital,
which then schedules the next round of executions
accordingly. 103 The cost of a death row organ varies from
organ to organ.10 4  For example, at Shanghai's China
International Organ Transplant Center, transplants are
priced as follows: a kidney transplant costs $62,000; a liver
transplant costs between $98,000 and $130,000; a lung
transplant costs between $150,000 and $170,000; and a heart
transplant costs between $130,000 and $160,000.10
Although the average American may not be aware that
these international black market transactions take place on a
fairly routine basis, physicians in America are not so naive.
101. E.g., id. Harry Wu, a human rights activist committed to exposing the
Chinese black market trade in body parts, showed ABC's Brian Ross a clipping
from a Chinese-language newspaper in New York that contained an
advertisement reading, "Kidney transplant in Mainland China. Don't miss the
opportunity. Call." Id. Investigators called the number, which led them to a
Chinese couple in Bridgeport, Connecticut, who served as organ brokers, acting
as the go-between for American buyers and a hospital supplier in southern
China owned by the People's Liberation Army. Id. Over the past several years,
hundreds of foreigners went to that particular hospital to receive death row
organ transplants. Id.
102. Contrast this with the waiting period on a donor list in the United
States and the temptation to go abroad will seem even stronger. See, e.g., House
Joins Senate Counterparts in Seeking to Get Organ Transplant Act Fully
Funded In FY 2006, TRANSPLANT NEWS, May 13, 2005, available at
http'//www.allbusiness.com/health-care-social-assistanceambulatory-health-
services/427730-1.html (noting that, in 2005, the median waiting time from
when the patient is placed on a donor waiting list to transplantation exceeds 4
years).
103. See, e.g., Hearings, supra note 45; PrimeTime, supra note 52.
104. Gorman, supra note 10, at 76 (stating that after an execution in China,
"[dioctors at military hospitals.., transplant the organs into wealthy foreigners
willing to pay anywhere from $10,000 to $40,000 for the operation").
105. Hua, supra note 62. Many go-betweens have been caught and arrested
by U.S. police. See generally John J. Goldman, Arrests Shed Light on China's
Booming Trade in Body Parts, EDMONTON J. (Can.), Feb. 25, 1998, at All. One
such incident involved a 41-year-old New York resident, Cheng Yong Wang,
who illegally brokered corneas, kidneys, livers, lungs, skin, and other organs
from executed Chinese prisoners. Id. Wang was contracted by Chinese
government agencies and hospitals to provide interested organ buyers from
New York. Id.
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Dr. Thomas Diflo, the director of kidney transplants at the
New York University Medical Center, notes that one of his
patients suffering from kidney failure returned from a trip to
China seeking post-operative care after receiving a new
kidney.' °6 Dr. Diflo has encountered several other patients
who concede that their newly acquired organs came from
executed Chinese prisoners.0 7 Dr. Stephen Tomlanovich, a
kidney transplant specialist at the University of California,
San Francisco, has treated several patients whom he suspects
also received kidneys from executed Chinese prisoners. 0
Thus, there is a growing concern within the medical
profession over the ethical dilemma these patients present to
American doctors when they fly overseas and allow another
life to be taken in order to save their own. 0 9
Presently, American patients who travel to China for
organ purchases often adopt an ambivalent attitude toward
the fact that the organs originate from unwitting death row
inmates. When Daniel Farley, a 57-year-old American,
traveled to China to buy a liver through a Shanghai hospital,
he discovered that the organ he received came from an
executed prisoner." In response, Farley said, "I'm a fairly
liberal guy, and it's not the greatest thing to think about....
But when you're faced with a certainty-and (the donors)
have a certainty-it's easier to take. Either someone was
sentenced to die or it was their time.""' Tony Lee, the senior
medical consultant of a Shanghai hospital offering transplant
services to Americans, reasons that "people come here
because they're desperate, and we offer them a chance of
living.... That's why they come here, because of something
we have here and nowhere else is offering."" 2
C. What Scholars Suggest that the U.S. Learn from China
1. Quid Pro Quo Bargains with Death Row
A growing number of scholars advocate the adoption of
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China's policy of organ procurement from prisoners. 113 They
maintain that permitting prisoner organ donation would
significantly increase the supply of organs in the United
States and utilize organs that would otherwise go to waste.1 4
In 1998, a "Life for a Life" bill was introduced in Congress
which would have allowed death row prisoners to donate their
kidneys in exchange for commuted sentences." 5 Then, in
2000, House Bill 999 proposed to encourage death row
prisoners to donate their organs. 16  Numerous state
legislators have pushed for similar bills to promote prisoner
organ donations by offering reductions of death sentences to
life imprisonment." 7  However, such legislative attempts
were ultimately unsuccessful." 8
2. Permitting a Domestic Free Market in Organs
On the other hand, a separate school of commentators
remains reluctant to tap into the American death row
community for organ supply.1 9 They point out the challenges
posed by organ procurement from prisoners executed by
lethal injection." ° Instead, they advocate the implementation
of a legalized organ market in the United States."' Since
113. See Patton, supra note 51, at 431-33.
114. Perales, supra note 67, at 694.
115. See Jason Strait, House Panel Nixes Plan for Inmate Organ Transplants,
ST. LouIs POST-DISPATCH, Apr. 10, 1998, at C3.
116. See Hinkle, supra note 36, at 599.
117. See Patton, supra note 51, at 432.
118. See Hinkle, supra note 36, at 600. See generally Missouri May Use
Death Row Organs: Inmates Could Trade Organ For Life Without Parole,
AKRON BEACON J. (Ohio), Mar. 16, 1998, at A7 [hereinafter Missouri]
(commenting on the national outrage incited when reports surfaced that China
procured organs from death row inmates as well as how proposals for procuring
organs from death row inmates in the United States were also met with
disfavor). As Carmen Epps of St. Louis, Missouri, puts it, "I wouldn't want
[death row] organs in my body." Id. Epps has been on a kidney waiting list for
over three years, but says she would rather continue dialysis than accept "an
organ from a murderer." Id.
119. See Missouri, supra note 118 (reporting that many Americans find the
notion of transplanting organs from prisoners into civilians to be unsettling).
120. See Perales, supra note 67, at 697. Lethal injection affects the prisoner's
circulatory system and contaminates the organs, rendering the organs unusable
for transplantation. See generally Fuller, supra note 64 (noting how execution
by gunshot is more "conducive to transplants because it does not contaminate
the prisoners' organs with poisonous chemicals, as lethal injections do, or
directly affect the circulatory system").
121. See, e.g., Steve P. Calandrillo, Cash for Kidneys? Utilizing Incentives to
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there is presently no federal law prohibiting financial
compensation for egg or sperm donations, many argue that
organ procurement laws should follow suit.
122
D. Bodies as Property and the Controversy Over
Commodification
The status of the human body as property, 123 a privacy
right, 2 4 or something in between 125 remains unsettled. 2 6 In
1872, a Rhode Island court held that "the body is not property
in the usually recognized sense of the word," 127 but rather,
should be viewed as a form of "quasi property, to which
certain persons may have rights."28  Under such a
philosophy, a person is not considered the owner of his body;
he merely holds "a sacred trust for the benefit of all who may
End America's Organ Shortage, 13 GEO. MASON L. REV. 69 (2004); Margaret R.
Sobota, Note, The Price of Life: $50,000 For an Egg, Why Not $1,500 For a
Kidney? An Argument to Establish a Market for Organ Procurement Similar to
the Current Market for Human Egg Procurement, 82 WASH. U. L.Q. 1225 (2004).
122. See generally Sobota, supra note 121, at 1244 (proposing that organ
donation should be compensated in a fashion similar to the current system of
compensation for egg donation).
123. As Professor Radhika Rao writes in a comprehensive and illuminating
article:
The image of the body as a form of property possessed by its 'owner'
dates back at least to John Locke... [who] asserted: . .. '[Elvery Man
has a Property in his own Person. This no Body has any Right to but
himself.'... Yet Locke apparently envisioned the body as property of a
special sort, held in trust rather than as an individual owner.... Thus
Locke apparently viewed individuals as stewards over their bodies,
possessing themselves in trust rather than as outright owners.
Therefore, despite his reliance upon property rhetoric, his image of the
rights individuals possess in their bodies clearly does not rise to the
level of complete ownership.
Radhika Rao, Property, Privacy, and the Human Body, 80 B.U. L. REV. 359, 367-
68 (2000) (original emphasis omitted).
124. See id. at 387 ("In other contexts, individuals are afforded autonomy
over their bodies under the umbrella of constitutional privacy rather than the
rules of property. Laws prohibiting contraception and abortion, for example,
are not addressed as 'deprivations' of a woman's bodily property or 'takings' that
require the payment of just compensation, but instead as invasions of her
constitutional privacy interests.").
125. See id. at 363.
126. See id. at 365-66 (noting that "[slometimes the body is characterized as
property, sometimes it is classified as quasi-property, and sometimes it is not
conceived as property at all, but rather as the subject of privacy rights").
127. Pierce v. Proprietors of Swan Point Cemetery, 10 R.I. 227, 242 (1872).
128. Id.
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from family or friendship have an interest in it." 129 However
as Professor William L. Prosser contends, "It seems
reasonably obvious that such 'property' is something evolved
out of thin air to meet the occasion" and is "a fiction likely to
deceive no one but a lawyer."1
30
Thus, the debate over whether human tissue and organs
may be seen as property roars on. 13' While the proposition of
a property interest in the body has yet to be expressly
addressed by the United States Supreme Court, 32 post-NOTA
case law has considered property rights in sperm and egg
cells. 33 For example, a California court held that a person
could have a property interest in his excised spleen, blood,
sperm, bone marrow, and skin cells. 3 4  However, the
California Supreme Court later reversed the decision,
135
concluding that the plaintiff abandoned his claim to the
excised tissue after it was removed. 36  Although the
California Supreme Court based its majority opinion in part
on the policy consideration that profiteering off a person's
own body parts should not be permitted, 37 it did not
expressly reject the notion that a person may have property
129. Id. at 243.
130. Rao, supra note 123, at 385 n.95 (citing W. PAGE KEETON ET AL.,
PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 12, at 63 (5th ed. 1984)).
131. See, e.g., Gloria J. Banks, Legal & Ethical Safeguards: Protection of
Society's Most Vulnerable Participants in a Commercialized Organ
Transplantation System, 21 AM. J.L. & MED. 45 (1995); Calandrillo, supra note
121; John H. Evans, Commodifying Life? A Pilot Study of Opinions Regarding
Financial Incentives for Organ Donation, 28 J. HEALTH POL. POL'Y & L. 1003
(2003); Michael B. Gill & Robert M. Sade, Paying for Kidneys: The Case Against
Prohibition, 12 KENNEDY INST. ETHIcs J. 17 (2002); Jennifer L. Hurley, Cashing
in on the Transplant List: An Argument Against Offering Valuable
Compensation for the Donation of Organs, 4 J. HIGH TECH. L. 117 (2004),
available at http'//www.jhtl.org/publications/V4NI/JHTL HurleyNote.pdf.
132. Chang, supra note 6, at 413 (noting that the Supreme Court has yet to
address the issue of the body as property).
133. E.g., Hecht v. Super. Ct., 20 Cal. Rptr. 2d 275, 276 (Ct. App. 1993)
(dispute over whether deceased's frozen sperm that he bequeathed to his
girlfriend constituted property); York v. Jones, 717 F. Supp. 421, 422 (E.D. Va.
1989) (dispute on whether property rights existed in cryogenically preserved
zygotes).
134. Moore v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 793 P.2d 479 (Cal. 1990) petition for
cert. denied, 499 U.S. 936 (1991).
135. Id. at 148.
136. Chang, supra note 6, at 414.
137. Id.; see also United States v. Garber, 607 F.2d 92 (5th Cir. 1979)
(implying that the sale of plasma may be permissible).
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rights in his own organs."'
In terms of international treatment of the
commodification issue, the sale of organs is banned in almost
every country139 and condemned by virtually all medical
associations around the world.140  Following China's recent
legislation,'4 1 Iran is likely the only exception to the anti-
commodification rule. 142  Furthermore, the World Health
Organization (WHO), 143 the United Nations' specialized
agency for health, expressly condemns commodification.1
4
Thus, now that China has retreated from commodification,
the legalization of an organ market in the United States will
be a challenging uphill battle, and will not likely reach
fruition any time soon.145 However, this should not be taken
to mean that such an alternative is not worth exploring.
III. THE CALL FOR A BETTER SYSTEM IN THE UNITED STATES
The United States' reliance on altruism has resulted in a
failed system of organ procurement and allocation.146
Although eighty-five percent of those surveyed in a 1990
Gallup poll expressed support for NOTA and the current
138. Id.
139. With the exceptions of Iran and Pakistan, where legal markets for
organs exist, free trade in human organs is banned in nearly all developed
nations. Calandrillo, supra note 121, at 86-87. However, this is not to say that
a black market in organ trading does not exist. Countries such as China, Israel,
South Africa, Turkey, Iraq, Argentina, India, and Brazil have very lenient laws
and their respective prohibitions are not strictly enforced. Id.
140. See Calandrillo, supra note 121; Christina Spencer, Permit Kidney
Sales, MDs Say, EDMONTON JOURNAL (CANADA), Jul. 4, 1998, at B7 ("The sale
of organs ... is condemned by the World Health Organization."); see also Finkel,
supra note 93, at 26.
141. See supra Part II.A.2.
142. See Finkel, supra note 93, at 26.
143. The WHO is governed by 192 member states, including both China and
the United States. See World Health Organization, Countries,
http'/www.who.int/countries/en/ (last visited Jan. 20, 2007).
144. See, e.g., World Health Organization, Organ Trafficking and
Transplantation Pose New Challenges, Sept. 1, 2004,
http://www.who.int/bulletin/volumes/82/9/fe ature0904/enl (last visited Jan. 20,
2007).
145. Professor Gary Becker notes: "[D]espite these strong arguments in favor
of allowing commercial markets in organs, I do not expect such markets to be
permitted any time in the near future because the opposition is fierce." Posting
of Gary Becker to The Becker-Posner Blog, http://www.becker-posner-
blog.com/archives/2006/01/should -the-purc.html (Jan. 1, 2006) [hereinafter
Becker Organ Blog] (last visited Jan. 20, 2007).
146. Goodwin, supra note 69, at 319.
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altruistic scheme, only twenty percent carried organ donor
cards. 147 As of April 2006, there were only 1,200 registered
donors in the United States. 148  Comparatively, there were
over 92,000 waiting list candidates hoping for an organ
donation, 149  only 2,300 of whom actually received
transplants. 150  Such discrepancies between thought and
action among the general American public typify the basis for
the scarcity.
As a result of this scarcity, more than 6,000 American
patients die each year waiting for an organ transplant, while
a new patient is added to a waiting list every fourteen
minutes. 5 ' In 2001, the national waiting list for donors had
more than 78,350 Americans waiting for organ transplants. 152
In less than three years, that number has climbed to
85,000.13 For every 50,000 patients that need a kidney, 54
only 15,000 transplant operations will actually be
performed. 15  Thus, the average wait for a replacement
kidney is four or more years. 156
As Professor Gary Becker points out, "To an economist,
the major reason for the imbalance between demand and
supply of organs is that the United States . .. forbid[s] the
purchase and sale of organs." 57 Unless American society can
live with its conscience when it turns a blind eye to these
terminally ill patients, a more efficient system of balancing
the demand and supply of organs must come forward.
Although China's black market approach proved less than
147. Perales, supra note 67, at 691.
148. Organ Procurement and Transplantation Network, http://www.optn.orgt
(last visited Jan. 20, 2007).
149. Id.
150. Id.
151. Chang, supra note 6, at 409. Chang notes that "[o]n average, 17 people
die every day waiting for an organ transplant, which translates to 6,100
individuals a year, while a new person is added to the organ donor waiting list
every 14 minutes." Id. See generally Cong. Kidney Caucus, 25 Facts About
Organ Donation and Transplantation,
http://www.house.gov/mcdermott/kidneycaucus/25facts.html (last visited Jan.
20, 2007) (providing more information and statistics on organ transplants).
152. See Smith, supra note 41.
153. Calandrillo, supra note 121, at 69.
154. Id. Of those waiting on the list, roughly 50,000 need a kidney. Id.
Experts anticipate this number will double within the next decade. Id.
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humanitarian, it at least tackled the scarcity issue and saved
lives. While the United States should never condone China's
pre-2006 practice of harvesting death row organs and should
ban Americans from going abroad for these services, it should
provide a practical and efficient domestic alternative.
IV. WHAT AMERICA CAN LEARN FROM CHINA, AND SECOND
THOUGHTS ON THE BODY AS PROPERTY
A. Death Row Prisoners Are Not a Viable Option
The American Society of Transplantation firmly opposes
organ donations from death row inmates. 158  The primary
concern with harvesting organs from inmates is whether
institutionalized persons can truly give informed consent.5 9
Their decision-making processes often become burdened with:
(1) their dependence on a system that both incarcerated them
and subsequently asks them to donate; (2) the potential
pressures to conform; and (3) fear of the consequences that
may ensue if they decide not to donate. 160
Throughout the 1960s, a market for plasma-derived
products emerged between plasma research centers and
major biologics firms that led to the exploitation of
prisoners.' 61 In particular, Austin R. Stough, a prison
physician, established a plasma center near a penitentiary
and injected volunteer prisoners with antigens, collecting
their hyperimmune plasma to be sold to major biomedical
firms.162 While the federal government should have been
aware of this practice, it did nothing to stop the exploitation
of these prisoners. 63 With no one regulating his business,
Stough went on to open more centers, and by the mid-1960s,
supplied twenty-five percent of the nation's hyperimmune
gamma globulin. 16 Critics noted that this operation was run
158. See Smith, supra note 41.




161. Hurley, supra note 131, at 132-33.
162. Id.
163. Id.
164. See id. at 133 n.121.
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"carelesslly] and reckless lly]"1 65 and often "risk[ed] the lives
and health of the prisoners in exchange for access to the
plasma. " 166 The exploitation of American prisoners did not
end there, however. As late as 1972, the pharmaceutical
industry performed more than ninety percent of its
experimental testing on prisoners. 67
With little to no ability to substantively prevent the
violation of prisoners' rights, the United States should not
look to its prisoners or death row for organ harvesting. The
likelihood and gravity of coercion and harm is too great to
risk. This argument, however, should be distinguished from
the one anti-commodification advocates make on behalf of the
poor. 168 No matter how afflicted with poverty, the poor are
free citizens of society with the liberty to choose how to live.
Unlike the poor, prisoners are, by the very nature of
imprisonment, in bondage. The fact that they may be
criminals does not justify exposing them to the conditions
death row inmates in China were subjected to. 69
B. What America Should Consider: Commodification of
Organs
1. The Mounting Need for Commodification
Although China adjusted its organ procurement laws to
more closely reflect American standards, Chinese government
officials noted that the new legislation was tentative, and
subject to future modifications. 70 In all likelihood, China's
organ procurement laws will be altered in the future because
the legislation provides no feasible means of legally obtaining
an organ. Prior to the 2006 legislation, citizens all over the
world who could not secure organs in their country due to the
altruistic model flocked to China to reap the benefits of
commodification.171 With fewer places to turn to for legal
165. Id.
166. Id.
167. See Baruch, supra note 159.
168. See infra note 182 and accompanying text.
169. See supra Part II.A.1.
170. See Beck, supra note 58.
171. The demand initially came from China's neighbors in Asia,
predominantly patients from Hong Kong and Taiwan, though Singapore,
Indonesia, and the Philippines quickly caught on to the business as well.
Goldman, supra note 105. Australians have also dealt with their citizens
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international organ sales, 72 desperate patients, including
American citizens, will inevitably turn to the black market, as
they have done with China in the past. If China tightens its
enforcement of the death row organ trade, the organ scarcity
problem will become an even more glaring issue in the coming
decades. Eventually, an open market on organs must be given
serious consideration.
2. Arguments Against Commodification
The majority of Western nations "abhor the idea" of
commodifying human organs and putting body parts up for
sale. 73 For the most part, the objections to a free market for
human organs are vocalized predominantly by
"nonparticipants," or those who do not need replacement
organs.174 It may be painless for a healthy individual to decry
those who buy organs from China's black market and
admonish those who suggest commodification as a solution to
the shortage of organ donors, but "[wihen a terminally ill
patient faces imminent death, the knowledge that death is
near often brings about an intense struggle for survival.' 75
Thus, it seems that mainstream society-those who are not
immediately confronted with the organ shortage problem-is
at leisure to debate the iniquity of commodification. 176
The argument against commodification that is least
traveling to China for transplants, a practice they call "transplant tourism."
See Dunn, supra note 64 (discussing the recent spawn of demand for
transplantable organs from China). In 2005, a British newspaper documented
twenty-nine patients who purchased an organ from China's death row. Sam
Greenhill, British Patients Buy Death Row Kidneys, DAILY MAIL (U.K.), Dec. 12,
2005, at 24. Canada, too, has discovered its own citizens traveling to China to
buy organs from China's death row. Spencer, supra note 140.
172. See supra notes 139-40 and accompanying text.
173. Spencer, supra note 140 (citing a survey taken on medical ethics that
showed people consistently "abhorred the idea" of exchanging money for
organs).
174. Posting of Richard Posner to The Becker-Posner Blog,
http://www.becker-posner-blog.com/archives/2006/O1/organ salesposn.html
(Jan. 1, 2006) (last visited April 22, 2006) ("It seems that the prohibited
transactions are prohibited because they are highly offensive to
nonparticipants; why they are highly offensive remains to be explained.").
175. Brian G. Hannemann, Body Parts and Property Rights: A New
Commodity for the 1990s, 22 Sw. U. L. REV. 399, 399 (1993).
176. See id. If probity is at issue, then it is just as iniquitous for Americans
to not participate in offering a viable solution to the failing altruistic model on
one hand and the black market on the other.
436 [Vol: 47
B UY ME A POUND OF FLESH
grounded in a concrete rationale also happens to be the one
most often and passionately raised-the fundamental concern
that organ commodification violates "the dignity of man."177
This contention is based on the belief that limitations exist as
to what can be bought or sold as a commodity.178 Some argue
that the personal body ought to be considered so "valuable,
priceless, or sacred that [it] should never be allowed into the
marketplace." 79
A second concern that opponents of commodification raise
is the strong potential for exploitation of the poor, who might
too easily be persuaded into selling a kidney to escape
mounting debt. 81 Opponents argue that, more often than
not, the seller will be poor enough to consider the sale while
the buyer is likely to be wealthy enough to afford the
purchase.' Additionally, another concern often raised is
that organ sellers will lack informed consent or, even if they
comprehend the implications of the transaction, they will not
heed precautions with adequate deliberation. 182 The common
theme throughout these contentions is a general fear that
177. Gail L. Daubert, Note, Politics, Policies, and Problems with Organ
Transplantation: Government Regulation Needed to Ration Organs Equitably,
50 ADMIN. L. REV. 459, 463 (1998).
178. L D de Castro, Commodification and Exploitation: Arguments in Favour
of Compensated Organ Donation, 29 J. MED. ETHICS 142 (2003), available at
httpJ/jme.bmjjournals.com/cgi/content/ful/29/3/142.
179. Id. at 142.
180. See Christian Williams, Note, Combating the Problems of Human Rights
Abuses and Inadequate Organ Supply Through Presumed Donative Consent, 26
CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L. 315, 316 (1994).
181. Id.
182. Calandrillo, supra note 121, at 95. Moreover, the lure of payment to
escape debt might lead poverty-stricken individuals to believe that selling a
kidney is worth any health risk. Id. at 95. Professor Calandrillo further writes
on arguments that commodification opponents often enumerate:
Compounding this problem is that potential sellers often suffer from
"optimism bias"--i.e., even if they understand the precise risks
involved, they often believe that those risks simply "won't happen to
me." Furthermore, sellers might impose unknown risk on buyers by
concealing adverse health information in their own past so as not to be
ruled out as a potential candidate for sale. Thus, if sellers are
pressured by poverty and simultaneously underestimate the risks that
organ sales involve or overestimate their ability to escape them,
society's confidence in their informed consent to the sale is seriously
undermined. The state therefore has a legitimate interest in stepping
in to protect the mental and physical health of potential sellers against
risks that they do not fully appreciate.
Id. at 95.
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legalizing an organ market will compromise the autonomy of
individuals comprising the lower economic rungs of society. 183
3. Arguments in Favor of Commodification
Running beneath the arguments in favor of
commodification lies the deep-rooted belief that in a free
society, citizens have the right to do as they will with their
own body. 8" Under this approach, a person's own organs
should be treated as his property in order to promote
economic efficiency and to guard negative liberty."5
Economic efficiency is promoted when a person has the power
to "internalize the costs and benefits " 18 6 of the use of his
resources and to "facilitate the market allocation of resources
to their highest-value users,"187 allowing participants to
benefit according to market demand. Further, acknowledging
property rights in the human body would help "secure
negative liberty, that is, to protect their owners from
interference by others in their affairs."'88
To counter the criticism that a legalized organ market
will coerce the poor into selling their organs, those in favor of
commodification liken the sale of organs to any other manner
of making money. As one commentator noted:
If the poor should not be allowed to sell a kidney... , then
they should not be allowed to take a job at a factory either,
or to shine shoes, etc. The poor agree to do any of these
only because they are "forced by poverty" to do so. Why
should someone be allowed to improve his financial
position in one manner but not in another? '89
183. See generally Hurley, supra note 131, at 132 (arguing that allowing for
economic incentives in organ procurement will lead to exploitation of the
underprivileged).
184. Francois Tremblay, Organ Trade is Moral, LIBERATOR, Oct. 30, 2002,
http'//www.liberator.net/articles/TremblayFrancois/OrganTrade.html (last
visited Jan. 23, 2007) (asserting that the freedom to do with our bodies as we
want "is the most noble and fundamental right that each human being has").
185. See Jedediah Purdy, A Freedom-Promoting Approach to Property: A
Renewed Tradition for New Debates, 72 U. CHI. L. REV. 1237, 1240-41 (2005);
see also RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 32-34 (6th ed. 2003)
('Legal protection of property rights creates incentives to exploit resources
efficiently.").
186. See Purdy, supra note 185, at 1240.
187. See id.
188. See id. at 1241.
189. See Bart Croughs, A Man's Body, A Man's Right, LIBERTY, June 2005, at
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If the objective is to increase the supply of replacement
organs for America's terminally ill, allowing a free market for
organ sales seems to be the most pragmatic solution. An
example of commodification's efficacy may be seen in the
procurement of oocytes, the undeveloped female reproductive
cells. 9 ° The method of extracting oocytes may be comparable
to that of kidneys or other organs,1 91 as both are extremely
intrusive to the donor 92 . Oocyte donors are compensated
anywhere between $4,000 and $35,000 per extraction. 193
Prompted by the financial incentive, and despite the inherent
risks in oocyte extractions and the discomfort involved,
thousands of women choose to market their eggs, 194
substantially reducing national oocyte shortages.195
Advocates of organ commodification are convinced that
similar success may be found in the legalization of valuable
consideration for organs. 96
In December 2001, the American Medical Association's
Council for Ethical and Judicial Affairs held that organ
commodification was not intrinsically unethical and that the
possibility of legalizing it in the United States warranted
further study. 197  Frank Riddick, chairman of the Council,
commented that the altruistic model was ineffective and that
"anything that is reasonable and ethical should be tried."98
Then, in June of 2002, the Council voted to encourage in-
20, available at http://libertyunbound.com/archive/2005-06/croughs-
organs.html.
190. See generally Rebecca Mead, Eggs for Sale, NEW YORKER, Aug. 9, 1999,
at 56.
191. Harris & Alcorn, supra note 4, at 230.
192. Oocyte extraction involves three consecutive weeks of intensive hormone
injections into the woman, temporarily halting ovulation. Id. Then, more
hormone stimulants are injected to cause ovarian hyperfunction. Id. The
woman's ovaries engorge while oocytes develop at an unnaturally rapid pace
inside her. Id. To extract the oocytes, she is sedated and a needle is inserted
into her to extract twelve oocytes, one at a time. Id. In light of how invasive
this procedure is, many commentators have drawn similarities between oocyte
extraction and organ transplants. Id.
193. Id. at 231.
194. See id. In 2001, approximately 5,000 women offered to sell their oocytes.
Id. at 230.
195. See Mead, supra note 190, at 56.
196. See Harris & Alcorn, supra note 4, at 231.
197. Deborah Josefson, United States Starts to Consider Paying Organ
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depth research and study on financial incentives as a means
of increasing organ donations. 99
Finally, bartering organs for valuable consideration
already occurs in the United States behind the veil of
altruism. Professor Richard Epstein illustrates this point
with a hypothetical involving two married couples. Wife 1
with blood type A needs a kidney, but Husband 1 is blood
type B. Wife 2 with blood type B also needs a kidney, but
Husband 2 is blood type A. Under the present system, there
would be no issue with Husband 1 donating a kidney to Wife
2 in exchange for Husband 2 donating a kidney to Wife 1-in
other words, a swap.200 To this, Professor Epstein adds:
There is a legal objection that you're not allowed to trade
or sell organs for "valuable considerations," but the folks
who run the kidney establishment-which is a world unto
itself-[have] managed to delude or persuade themselves
that these swaps are, in fact, pure altruism instead of
altruism within families or swaps across families. I don't
care about the linguistics at this point-I think it's
baloney. 201
Whether the bargained-for exchange is kidney-for-kidney
or kidney-for-money, both agreements commodify the human
organ. Why, then, is one, the "market for barter"20 2 of kidney-
for-kidney, permissible in the United States, and the other
market, kidney-for-money, not only illegal, but considered
morally reprehensible?
V. DYING FOR A BETTER SOLUTION
A. Establishing a Private Institution to Supervise Organ
Commerce
The utilization of a natural resource of which the United
States has plenty-human bodies-and motivating the use of
such with the strongest incentive known to man short of
survival-financial compensation-is the best way to
199. Kolber, supra note 70, at 672.
200. See Richard Epstein & Russ Roberts, The Economics of Organ
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alleviate organ scarcity. To adequately supply the present
demand for replacement organs in this country, Congress
should legalize the trade of organs. 20 3  As a means of
regulating this trade and safeguarding the rights of the
parties involved, a private agency should be established to
supervise transactions for the sale of organs. While many
hesitate to trust administrative agencies, particularly in a
matter as controversial and sensitive as organ commerce, it is
significant to note that organ procurement is already
monitored through a network of organized institutions-the
regional OPOs that administer the current system under the
authority of OPTN and UNOS. °4 Thus, agency involvement
in the organ procurement system is not a novel proposal.2 °5
In fact, this comment proposes that the United States retain
the current model, subject to the following modifications.
The first step in the proposed change is to repeal the ban
on commodification contained in NOTA. Presently, the OPTN
facilitates the organ matching process and implements policy
pursuant to authority granted by NOTA.2 °6 However, the
OPTN should be empowered to serve dual regulatory
purposes: (1) to maintain UNOS and the regional OPOs
under the current altruistic model; and (2) to oversee a new
private administrative agency (Agency) to regulate the organ
market. Thus, the altruistic model would continue to thrive,
as it would be supplemented by legalized commodification.
The Agency would report to a committee specifically
established within the OPTN to oversee the Agency's
activities. Similar to transplants conducted through the
regional OPOs under the altruistic model, all transplants set
up by the Agency would take place at hospitals belonging to
the OPTN. This would permit the OPTN to meet its goal of
ensuring quality medical care to transplant patients by
regulating the quality of the hospitals in which patients
receive transplants.
Although the Agency would report to the OPTN, it should
be privately funded and, to the greatest extent possible,
203. See generally Becker Organ Blog, supra note 145 ("My conclusion is that
markets in organs are the best available way to enable persons with defective
organs to get transplants much more quickly than under the present system.").
204. See supra Part II.B.1.
205. See supra Part II.B.1.
206. See supra Part II.B.1.
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privately run, independent of government intervention. The
current organ procurement system is set up in layered tiers,
with NOTA above OPTN and UNOS, which are then further
partitioned into the regional OPOs.2 °7 The rationale behind
this structure was to keep the system as free from
bureaucracy as possible. °8 Similarly, keeping the Agency
privately funded would mean less bureaucracy imposed by
federal government involvement. The ideal scenario would be
for the Agency to operate autonomously, with periodic reports
issued to the OPTN as a means of safeguarding the welfare
and basic rights of the individuals involved in transplants.
All procedures carried forth by the Agency would be in
accordance with sound medical judgment, under the same
standards as the current system.
The repeal of the ban on commodification in NOTA would
mean that parties could buy and sell human organs under
terms they negotiate, but only under exacting conditions set
forth by the Agency.20 9 The OPTN would furnish to the
Agency a list of buyers, or terminally ill patients who wish to
purchase replacement organs. Those who wish to sell their
organs would contact the Agency and fill out a comprehensive
application that would supply enough information for the
Agency to conduct a background check. The purpose of such
investigations would be to confirm the healthy condition of
the seller, adequate matching between buyer and seller, and
a means of verifying the parties' intentions in an effort to
detect any sign of coercion as early as possible. If there is a
match between a buyer and a seller, a representative from
the Agency would meet with the seller and exhaustively
review the consequences of the operation. The buyer and
seller would then negotiate their own contract, under the
guidance of the Agency representative assigned to that
particular pairing. The representative's primary function in
this phase would be to ensure that the agreement is not
unreasonable, and that the parties have equal bargaining
power. A fixed cap and floor on the price for the organ would
further help ensure fairness. Terms regarding who should
207. See supra Part II.B.1.
208. See supra Part II.B.1.
209. Cf Harris & Alcorn, supra note 4 (proposing a government-regulated
market for posthumous organs where licensed brokers operate under the
oversight of the Food and Drug Administration).
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bear the risk of loss in the event of complications would also
be settled by the parties, though the Agency representative
could encourage terms as favorable to the seller as possible
(e.g., the buyer could promise to pay up to a certain amount of
medical expenses for the seller in the event something goes
wrong after the exchange).
B. Fostering a Future Market for Organs
Since only non-vital organs may be retrieved from live
donors, 210 a future market in posthumous organs should be
established and run by the Agency in conjunction with the
aforementioned proposal. 1 Under this proposal, individuals
would be able to approach the Agency and agree to sell their
organs postmortem for transplantation purposes. Each organ
would have a bargained-for price determined by negotiations
between the Agency and the conferring individual. Then, for
each of the organs removed, the individual's family or heirs
would be compensated in the bargained-for amount. The
individual, however, would be able to rescind the contract at
any time before his death, thereby making the contract
binding and enforceable only posthumously. Furthermore,
these contracts should remain strictly confidential, and would
ideally remain undisclosed to the individual's family until
after death.
VI. CONCLUSION
In light of the strong opposition to a free market
approach toward organ procurement and allocation, any
changes in law to the contrary of current policy will take
decades to implement. But this does not mean such a
proposal should be disregarded. China's former black market
in death row organs merely presents a stark example of what
can go wrong with the free market approach if it is not
carefully regulated. This comment does not propose an
anarchic attitude toward organ commodification; it simply
210. For example, if a pair of vital organs, such as kidneys, both function
properly, one of the two paired kidneys may be considered "non-vital." See id. at
215. Regenerative organs, such as skin, blood, hair, sperm, and oocytes may
also be taken from live donors. Id. at 216.
211. Many scholars urge that even if organ commodification remains
prohibited, a "future market" should be pursued. See Harris & Alcorn, supra
note 4, at 214.
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advocates that both the legal and medical communities devote
a more thorough consideration to this prospect. 212 If this does
not occur, thousands of innocent patients will die because a
life-saving replacement organ was not available.
212. For a comprehensive anthology on the issue of commodification, see
RETHINKING COMMODIFICATION: CASES AND READINGS IN LAW AND CULTURE
(Martha M. Ertman & Joan C. Williams eds., 2005).
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